When Are Three Federal Judges Required--An Inquiry into the Meaning of Section 266 of the Judicial Code by Bowek, Alfred W.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1931
When Are Three Federal Judges Required--An
Inquiry into the Meaning of Section 266 of the
Judicial Code
Alfred W. Bowek
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bowek, Alfred W., "When Are Three Federal Judges Required--An Inquiry into the Meaning of Section 266 of the Judicial Code"
(1931). Minnesota Law Review. 817.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/817
MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
VOLU E XVI DECEMBER, 1931 No. I
WHEN ARE THREE FEDERAL JUDGES REQUIRED?
AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SECTION 266' OF TIE
JUDICIAL CODE
By ALFRED WV. BowEK*S ECTION 266 of the United States Judicial Code- provides that
before a federal district court may issue an interlocutory in-
junction suspending or restraining, upon the ground of unconsti-
tutionality, the enforcement of any state statute or order of a state
administrative board acting pursuant to state statute by restraining
the action of a state officer in the enforcement of such statute or
order, the matter must be heard and determined by a tribunal of
three judges, at least one of whom must be a justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States or a circuit judge. It is the
purpose of this article to consider the application of this section,
and to discuss 'the construction placed upon it by the Supremc
*Of the Minneapolis bar.
"Section 266 is set out in full in footnote 2, below. In this article, tile
Urgent Deficiencies Act will also be included. The latter provides for pro-
cedure in the federal courts, in suits to restrain the enforcement of orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, exactly like that provided in
section 266 as regards state statutes or orders of state administrative boards.
The Urgent Deficiencies Act has been extended by statute (Packers and
Stockyards Act, sec. 316, 7 U.S.C..t sec. 217, Mason's Code, tit. 7, sec. 217,
to include proceedings brought to restrain or annul orders of the secre-
tary of agriculture. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, (1930)
280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220, 74 L. Ed. 524. The Urgent Deficiencies
Act is the Act of 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, 2-0, U. S. C. tit. 28, sec.
47, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 47, Mason's Code, tit. 28, sec. 47. Section 238
Judicial Code, subsec. 4, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 345, subsec. 4, Mason's Code.
tit. 28, sec. 345, subsec. 4, provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States from action of the statutory three-judge court re-
quired under the prior section, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 47, Mason's Code, tit.
28, sec. 380. In the discussion, unless the distinction is made by using
the term "act" in comparison to the term "section," all references to the
"section" will include both.
2Section 266, Judicial Code, sec. 266, 36 Stat. 1162, 28 U. S. C. A.
sec. 380, Mason's Code, tit. 28, sec. 380. The text of the section is as
follows:
"No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any statute of a State by restraining the action of
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Court in the tventy-nine cases in which its meaning has been
under consideration. The word "section" used in this discussion
means section 266, and the word "Act" means the Urgent De-
ficiencies Act of similar import.
any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute,
or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative
board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such
State, shall be issued or granted by any Justice of the Supreme Court,
or by any district court of the United States, or by any Judge thereof, or
by any ciycuit judge acting as district judge, upon the ground of the
unconstitutionality of such statute, unless the application for the same shall
be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to a
circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges,
of whom at least one shall be a justice of the Supreme Court or a circuit
judge, and the other two may be either circuit or district judges, and unless
a majority of said three judges shall concur in granting such application,
Whenever such application as aforesaid is presented to a justice of the
Supreme Court, or to a judge, he shall immediately call to his assistance to
hear and determine the application two other judges: Provided, however,
That one of such three judges shall be a justice of the Supreme Court, or
a circuit judge. Said application shall not be heard or determined before
at least five days' notice of the hearing has been given to the governor and
the attorney general of the State, and to such other persons as may be
defendants in the suit; Provided, That if of opinion that irreparable
loss or damage would result to the complainant unless a temporary re-
straining order is granted, any justice of the Supreme Court, or any circuit
or district judge, may grant such temporary restraining order at arty time
before such hearing and determination of the application for an interlocutory
injunction, but such temporary restraining order shall remain in force only
until the hearing and determination of the application for an interlocutory
injunction upon notice as aforesaid. The hearing upon such application
for an interlocutory injunction shall be given precedence and shall be in
every way expedited and be assigned for a hearing at the earliest practicable
day after the expiration of the notice hereinbefore provided for. An appeal
may be taken direct to the Supreme Court of the United States from the
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory in-
junction in such case. It is further provided that if before the final hearing
of such application a suit shall have been brought in a court of the State
having jurisdiction thereof under the laws of such State, to enforce such
statute or order, accompanied by a stay in such State court of proceedings
under such statute or order pending the determination of such suit by such
State court, all proceedings in any court of the United States to restrain
the execution of such statute or order shall be stayed pending the final de-
termination of such suit in the courts of the State. Such stay may be
vacated upon proof made after hearing, and notice of ten days served upon
the attorney general of the State, that the suit in the State courts is not
being prosecuted with diligence and in good faith. The requirement re-
specting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the final hearing
in such suit in the district court; and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
may be taken from a final decree granting or denying a permanent inj unc-
tion in such suit." (June 18, 1910, ch. 309, sec. 17, 36 Stat. 557.) The
section was originally enacted in 1910; was amended to include order of
state administrative boards or commissions, in 1913; and again in 1925, to
require the presence of three judges at the final hearing. Mar. 3, 1911,
ch. 231, sec. 266, 36 Stat. 1162; Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013; Feb,
13, 1925, ch. 229, sec. 1, 43 Stat. 938.
3See footnote 1.
WHEN ARE THREE FEDERAL JUDGES REQUIRED?
The four points to which the discussion will be confined are:
first, when are three judges required by the section; second, what
restrictions are placed upon the power of any single justice or
judge holding a district court to act in cases within the section;
third, what provisions are made for review; and fourth, which
courts have jurisdiction of cases within the section.
Some conception of the difficulty arising in the application
of the section to actual practice may be gathered from a pre-
liminary analysis of the twenty-nine cases. Twenty of these cases
were claimed to be within the section. The Supreme Court held
seven of these not within the section. Nine cases were claimed
to be within the similar Urgent Deficiencies Act; four were held
not to be within it.
The action of the lower federal courts was affirmed in nine
cases, appeals were dismissed in two cases, and mandamus was
denied in five cases, making a total of sixteen cases in which the
lower court's action was sustained as proper and correct. On
the other hand, it was reversed in eight cases, including action of
the circuit court of appeals in one case, and mandamus was
granted in six cages, making a total of fourteen cases in which
the lower court's action was held improper and erroneous. In
addition there were several cases which could have been decided
by the single judge, where he needlessly called in two others,
who referred the case back to him in two cases and continued
to function in the other cases.4
1. IN WHAT CAsEs ARE THREE JUDGES REQuIRMD?
The purpose and scope of section 266 are clearly and con-
cisely set forth in one of the earliest decisions, the Cumyberland
Case,5 as follows:
4Citations for the above statements have been omitted because of lack
of space and because the cases are cited elsewhere. Where the same
reasons apply, like omissions have been made below. [Ed.]
5 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, (1922)
260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217. This was a suit by a tele-
plone company to restrain the defendant commission from putting into
effect a reduction of telephone rates, alleged to be confiscatory. A single
judge granted a temporary restraining order, which lie continued after a
three-judge court had denied an interlocutory injunction. (See footnote
72 and text.) The Supreme Court granted mandamus to set aside the
order of the single judge continuing the temporary restraining order. On
this question, the Court said: "We are of the opinion that a single judge has
no power, in view of section 266, to affect the operation of the order of the
court constituted by the three judges granting or denying the interlocutory
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"The legislation was enacted for the manifest purpose of taking
away the power of a single United States judge, whether district
judge, circuit judge, or circuit justice holding a district court of
the United States, to issue an interlocutory injunction against the
execution of a state statute by a state officer or of an order of an
administrative board of the state pursuant to a state statute, on
the ground of the federal unconstitutionality of the statute. Pend-
ing the application for an interlocutory injunction, a single judge
may grant a restraining order to be in effect until the hearing of
the application, but thereafter, so far as enjoining the state officers
his powers are exbaustedl. The wording of the statute leaves no
doubt that Congress was by provision ex industria seeking to
make interference by interlocutory injunction from a federal court
with the enforcement of state legislation regularly enacted and in
the course of execution, a matter of the adequate hearing and the
full deliberation which the presence of three judges, one of whom
should be a circuit justice or judge, was likely to secure. It was
to prevent the improvident granting of such injunctions by a
single judge, and the possible unnecessary conflict between federal
and state authority always to be deprecated."
The question of the power of the single federal judge or of
the three judges to act in such cases is jurisdictional. It is "one
of statutory power and jurisdiction, not one of judicial discretion
or equitable consideration."'
It may be well to note here, that the section contemplates only
restraint against legislative acts of the states, as may be seen
injunction applied for. To hold that he may grant a temporary injunction
varying the order of the three judges would be to make the legislation a
nullity and work the result Congress was at pains to avoid .... This is a
question of statutory power and jurisdiction, not one of judicial diseretiou
or equitable consideration." In Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry,
Co., (1927) 274 U. S. 588, 47 Sup. Ct. 720, 71 L. Ed. 1219, a case within the
concurrent jurisdiction of both federal and state courts, the railroad
sought to set aside the remsal of the state commission to permit the rail-
road to remove a certain station. In sustaiging the dismissal of the bill
by the three-judge statutory court, the Court said: "Such railroads are
subject to regulation by both the state and the United States. The delilmi-
tation of the respective power of the two governments requires often nice
adjustment. The federal power is paramount. But public interest demands
that, whenever possible, conflict betwen the two authorities and irritation
be avoided. To this end it is important that the federal power be not
asserted unnecessarily, hastily, or harshly. It is important also, that the
demands of comity and courtesy, as well as of the law, be deferred to."
(See footnote 5. See also the Court's footnote. 1, in Ex parte Wil-
liams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877; and the court's
footnote 1, in Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct, 585, 72
L. Ed. 990. The fact that the parties, and particularly the defendant, vol-
untarily consent to inaction of the state's officers, and thus dispense with,
or consent to a formal temporary restraining order or interlocutory in-
junction, cannot divest the statutory court of jurisdiction. Brucker v.
Fisher, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 759. See also footnote 10.
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from a reading of the section and of the decisions. No express
words in the section or any possible implication can afford any
reasonable basis for extending the requirements of the section to
cases where the acts of the executive or judiciary departments of
the state, as such, are sought to be restrained. And a legislative
act, for the purpose of determining the applicability of the section,
includes orders' of an administrative board of a state acting under
and pursuant to state statute.
It may be well also to define and enumerate the kinds of re-
straint by injunction discussed herein and in the cases cited. Three
'kinds of injunctions are discussed herein, although an additional
label is sometimes used in the books and in the cases. The first
kind of restraint is the temporary restraining order, -which is the
summary, immediate restraint imposed by order of the court, or-
dinarily the single district judge before whom the case first
appears for consideration and action. This kind of restraint is
often, and in contemplation of the section may be, granted ex parte
by the single judge. The second kind is the interlocutory injunc-
tion. This is the restraint imposed and allowed only after a hear-
ing and argument of counsel, either oral or by brief. Under the
section this relief can be allowed only by the three-judge court.
When granted, the effect of the interlocutory injunction is to re-
strain the state during the time between the hearing on the
application for interlocutory injunction and the final hearing when
the case is finally determined and a permanent decree is granted or
denied. The third kind of restraint is the permanent injunction,
which likewise can be granted, under the terms of the section, only
by three judges. A. fourth name is sometimes used, i.e. pre-
liminary injunction, but this is not, in fact, the name for a fourth
kind of restraint, but is used rather loosely to designate either
the temporary restraining order or the interlocutory injunction.
In this discussion only the first three terms will be used.
7
"There arises the objection that no ground for equitable interference
by the Courts of the United States is shown by the bill. The only injury
alleged is the -result of the suit in the state courts. So far as appears that
result will ensue only upon a decision against the appellant. It is an odd
ground for an injunction against a suit that the *suit may turn out against
the party sued." Northport Power & Light Co. v. Hartley, (1931) 283
U. S. 568, 51 Sup. Ct. 581, 75 L. Ed. 811.
SThe question of what are orders within the meaning of the section
is discussed below. As to the question of whether legislative, rather than
executive or judicial acts of a state are within the section, see footnotes 7
and 24 and text.
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A. The Function of the Plaintiff in Determining Whethcr
the Section Shall Apply- In the first instance, it is the plain-
tiff, or the complainant as he is sometimes called, who dle-
termines whether the case will lie within the section. He alone
controls," for he decides what relief he is seeking. Upon the
relief sought depends the question whether the section will apply.
The controlling feature is whether or not an interlocutory injunc-
tion on the ground of unconstitutionality is sought and pressed.
If all the other elements' 0 necessary to invoke the section are
present, the plaintiff's application for such relief, or its absence,
is the deciding factor. Where, given such other elements, the
plaintiff seeks an interlocutory injunction, on such ground, the
section will apply; if he does not seek such relief, the section will
not apply." Nor does the section apply where, having asked for
such relief in his original papers, the plaintiff abandons such
9"The plaintiff is given an election. He may either make application
for an interlocutory injunction, which must be heard by three judges, in
which case the final hearing must be before a like court with appeal directly
to this court, or he may not press an application for an interlocutory injunc-
tion, in which case the final hearing may be before a single judge, whose
decision may be reviewed by the circuit court of appeals and this court
under other applicable provisions of the judicial code." Per Hughes, C. J., in
Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8,
75 L. Ed. 71. See also discussion, infra, under the heading, "Relief sought"
and text at footnote 122. See also Brucker v. Fisher, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1931) 49 F. (2d) 759.
1OFor the distinction as to what interests of the plaintiff are sufficient
to entitle him to intervene, but insufficient to entitle him to bring suit under
the section, or under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, see, Alexander Sprunt &
Son v. United States, (1930) 281 U. S. 249, 50 Sup. Ct. 315, 74 L. Ed. 832,
in which the cases are collected. See also Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v.
United States, (1930) 281 U. S. 479, 50 Sup. Ct. 378, 74 L. Ed. 980. Both
the foregoing cases were under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, For a case
under the section, see Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, (1927) 272
U. S. 525, 47 Sup. Ct. 189, 71 L. Ed. 387. See also City of Chicago v.
Chicago Rapid Transit Co., (1931) 52 Sup. Ct. 2, in which the city had been
permitted to intervene below, in a suit to restrain an order of the
Illinois Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the
appeal of the city from the order of the statutory court, said, "The Court is
of the opinion that the City of Chicago has no separate standing which
entitles it to appeal." That mere equitable grounds will not suffice, see
Northport Power & Light Co. v. Hartley, (1931) 283 U. S. 568, 51 Sup, Ct.
581, 75 L. Ed. 811. On the other hand, the absence of equitable grounds
is fatal to the right to sue. Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, (1927)
272 U. S. 525, 47 Sup. Ct. 189, 71 L. Ed. 487. The absence of a state
statute or order challenged as unconstitutional is also fatal. Northport
Power & Light Co. v. Hartley, (1931) 283 U. S. 568, 51 Sup. Ct. 581, 75
L. Ed. 811.
"In re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036:
Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed. 699.
See also footnote 9.
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request, as by written or oral withdrawal in open court,12 or aban-
dons it by implication, as by waiving the question of unconstitu-
tionality, or by conceding for purposes of a present motion that
the statute or order originally challenged is constitutional.- In
such a case the defendant cannot compel the plaintiff to continue,
resume, or otherwise prosecute his original prayer for such relief.
This is the decisive point of the Hobbs Case," in which the Court
said:
"... The injunction... is not within the Judicial Code, section
266 as amended. . . . Three judges were not necessary, and the
petitioners have no right to come here. . . . The judge was
clearly right in treating the plaintiffs in the several suits as masters
to decide what they would ask and in denying to the defendants,
the petitioners, the power to force upon them a constitutional
issue which at the moment they did not care to raise. The fact
that the bills raised it did not prevent them from presenting a
narrower claim and contenting themselves with the granting of
that."
Nor is the question dependent upon whether the court believes the
12Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 353.
In this case certain insurance companies sued to restrain a state officer
from enforcing an order of the state board relating to insurance rates, on
the ground that the order was unconstitutional. The suit wvas brought in
the federal court, and diversity of citizenship was alleged and shown. The
bill prayed for a temporary restraining order, an interlocutory injunction,
and a permanent injunction on the grounds of unconstitutionality of the
order. Defendant moved the court to call in two other judges. There-
upon, the plaintiffs definitely stated that they abandoned their application
for interlocutory injunction upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of
the order, but demanded such relief on the usual equitable grounds. The
single judge denied the motion of the defendants and granted an inter-
locutory injunction on the usual equitable grounds, the ground of uncon-
stitutionality having been abandoned. Mandamus to compel the singlejudge to call in two other judges wvas denied by the Supreme Court. It
may be observed that in this case the defendants were seeking to force
the plaintiffs to demand the very thing from which the section protects
the state, namely, an interlocutory injunction on the ground of uncon-
stitutionality. Cf. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind. v. Batesville Tel. Co.,
(1931) 52 Sup. Ct. 1, a case in which no interlocutory injunction wvas
sought, and a single judge denied the relief sought; appeal was taken
to the circuit court of appeals, which reversed the district court on the
ground that the action of the commission was void because in excess of its
powers under state law; on direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the
circuit court of appeals, judgmefit of the latter court was affirmed be-
cause the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court said, "As in
this case the circuit court of appeals did not decide against the validity
of the order of the Public Service Commission upon the asserted federal
grounds, but dealt with its validity solely under the state law, the appeal
must be dismissed!'
13Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273.
14See footnote 12.'
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statute or order challenged is constitutional. It has been held that
where a judge decided that the section did not apply to the case
before him because he was of the opinion that the statute chal-
lenged was constitutional, and intended so to hold in disposing of
the case, his order of dismissal based upon such decision was made
without jurisdiction and void."
B. Statute and Orders-The question of what is a statute,
within the meaning of the section, has been before the Court on
many occasions. In eleven cases, a statute was directly challenged
as unconstitutional. Six cases were held to challenge a statute
within the meaning of the section. A state statute authorizing the
appropriation of certain lands by designated condemnation pro-
ceedings, the enforcement of which by state officials was sought
to be restrained as unconstitutional, by interlocutory injunction,
was, held, in an early decision,"0 to be within the section, The same
result was reached in later cases, as to a state statute requiring all
common carriers to obtain certificates from a state board,17 a
statute providing for a tax levy upon certain carriers,' 8 another
"5Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct.
600, 55 L. Ed. 575.
lGEx parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup.
Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575. The state of Kansas passed an Act, in effect
authorizing the summary appropriation of the lands affected by certain
pending condemnation proceedings. The petitioner, a West Virginia cor-
poration, dommenced a suit to restrain a Kansas Drainage District from
taking possession of its lands under the Act, upon the ground that the
Act was unconstitutional. A single judge granted a temporary restraining
order, but on the hearing for interlocutory injunction lie refused to call
in two other judges, ruling that: "the provisions of such section [Section
266] merely deprived a single judge of the power to grant a temporary
[interlocutory?] injunction, and a court might be held by one judge for
the purpose of decreeing the assailed statute to be constitutional." In re-
versing this decision, the Supreme Court said: "The suit being of the
nature just stated, we are of the opinion that the provisions of the Act of
Congress which are relied upon applied to the case, and that, as a result
of their application, it imperatively follows, that the hearing and deter-
mination of the request for a temporary [interlocutory?] injunction should
have been had before a court consisting of three judges, constituted by the
mode specified in the statute."
'
7 Clark v. Poor, (1927) 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702, 71 L. Ed.
1200. Plaintiffs contended that as carriers engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce they could not constitutionally be required to apply for a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity as required by the state statute, and
sought to restrain state officials from enforcing the statute. An interlocu-
tory injunction was granted, but on final hearing the statutory court
denied a permanent injunction. The decision and the jurisdiction of the
statutory court were affirmed on direct appeal.
t1nterstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, (1928) 276 U. S. 245, 48 Su),
Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551. Plaintiff corporation sought to restrain state tax
officials from levying taxes uopn it pursuant to a state statute, upon thle
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state statute authorizing condemnation proceedings,", a statute
requiring the payment by foreign railway corporations of certain
minimum franchise taxes on business done within the state,20 and
a case where the single judge believed the matter would become
moot.
2
'
Five cases were held not to challenge a statute within the
meaning of the section. Two of these were so decided merely be-
cause no interlocutory injunction was sought,22- or because the
application' was abandoned.22 In the other three cases, the attack
was directed respectively against a city ordinance,24 an assessment
of a state equalization board,"2 and the enforcement of a statute
by city officials, "0 rather than by state officers.
It would appear, therefore, that in order to be within the
section, the plaintiff must challenge a legislative act of the state,
on the ground of unconstitutionality, and plaintiff must seek
to restrain its enforcement on behalf of the state, through action
of officers of the state.
ground that the statute was unconstitutional as interference with interstate
commerce. The statutory court issued an interlocutory injunction, but,
upon final hearing, dissolved it, and denied a penanent injunction. The
decision and the court's jurisdiction were affirmed on direct appeal.
'
9Dohany v. Rogers, (1930) 281 U. S. 362, 50 Sup. Ct. 299, 74 L. Ed.
904.
"oStratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup.
Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71.
2"Ex parte Atlantic Coast Ry. Co., (1928) 279 U. S. 822, 49 Sup. Ct.
478, 73 L. Ed. 977.
22Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202.
"-Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed.
353. For the facts of this case, see footnote 12.
24Ex parte Collins, (928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585. 72 L. Ed.
990. "The suit is not one to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execu-
tion of a statute of a state within the meaning of section 266. That section
was intended to embrace ... only those [cases] in which the object of the
suit is to restrain the enforcement of a statute of general application or the
order of a state board or commission .... It is municipal action, not the
statute of a state, whose 'enforcement, operation or execution' the petitioner
seeks to enjoin." See the Court's footnotes 2 and 3 in this case. For a case
in which a local city ordinance was challenged, but properly not sought to
be brought within the terms of the section, see City of Hammond v.
Schappi Bus Lines, (1927) 275 U. S. 164, 48 Sup. Ct. 66, 72 L. Ed. 218.
in which case a single judge granted an interlocutory injunction; appeal was
taken to the circuit court of appeals, and subsequently from that court the
case reached the Supreme Court.
25Ex parte Williams, (1928) 2777 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed.
877. A Nebraska statute provided for the assessment of railroad property
by the state board of equalization. The Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. sued the
petitioner to enjoin the collection of taxes levied by the board upon the
ground that the assessment was unconstitutional. An interlocutory injunc-
tion was sought. The single judge refused to call in two other judges,
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Such legislative acts of the state are, of course, ordinarily
statutes, duly enacted by the state legislature, approved by the
governor, and followed by whatever other formality is required
by state law. When such a .state act is challenged as unconstitu-
tional, the question whether or not a "statute" is challenged
within the meaning of the section is relatively easy. A more
troublesome question arises when an order of a state administra-
tive board alone is challenged. An order or some other act of
state officials is, of course, ordinarily involved in cases where only
the statute is challenged, for until the statute is put into operation
or attempted to be enforced and in some way affects the plaintiff,
he cannot bring suit to restrain the enforcement of the statute.
But a great number of the cases arise where there is no question
of the constitutionality of the statute, which may not be challenged
at all, or may- be conceded to be valid. The controlling, if not the
sole issue, in such cases, is the constitutionality of the order,
without any reference to the statute. This class of cases has led
to much litigation and Congress has made it the subject of
special legislation, in the form of an amendment to the section.
The validity of orders only, as distinguished from statutes, was
questioned in nine cases under the section and in nine cases under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act.
It has been seriously questioned, both before and after the
amendment,2 7 whether the section is intended to apply to such
cases. But it would seem that on this point there no longer can
be any doubt. The Supreme Court apparently has settled the
question, in the following language :28
upon the ground that the case was not within the section. The Supreme
Court refused mandamus to compel him to call the other judges, saying:
"A case does not fall within section 266 unless a statute or order of an
administrative board or commission is challenged as contrary to the federal
constitution .... Here there was no question of the validity of the taxilg
statute. It was the assessment which the railroad challenged. And an
assessment is not an order made by an administrative board or commission,
within the meaning of that section. The function of the assessing board is
not that of issuing orders. Its function is informational." For other cases
involving assessments, see the Court's footnote 2, in this case. Cf. footnote 47,
-6Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202. See also the discussion under "officers"
infra; and for other cases involving officers, the Court's footnote 4 in Ex
parte Collins, (1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup, Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990, and the
discussion on this point by the Court in United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R.
Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 237, 75 L. Ed. 349.
"-The amendment referred to here and in the quotation from the Okla-
homa Case following immediately in the text, is the Act-of Mar. 4, 1913,
ch. 160. 37 Stat. 1013. For the full text of the section, see footnote 2.
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"A doubt has been suggested whether these cases are within
section 266 of the Judicial Code .... The section originally for-
bade interlocutory injunctions restraining the action of state offi-
cers in the enforcement or execution of any statute of a state,
upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, without a hearing by
three judges. The amendment inserted after the words 'enforce-
ment or execution of such statute' the words 'or in the enforce-
ment or execution of an order made by an administrative board
or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such
state' but did not change the statement of the ground, which still
reads 'the unconstitutionality of such statute.' So if the section
is construed with narrow precision it may be argued that the un-
constitutionality of the order is not enough. But this court has
assumed repeatedly that the section was to be taken more broad-
ly.... The amendment seems to have been introduced to prevent
any question that such orders were within the section. It was
superfluous, as the original statute covered them. . . . But it
plainly was intended to enlarge, not to restrict the law. We men-
tion the matter simply to put it at rest."
Accordingly, the following cases have been held to be within the
section. In none of them was there any question as to the validity
of the statute, but only the order of a state administrative board
was challenged: an order regulating carrier rates,2 0 an order
reducing such rates,30 an order refusing a license to carry on a
certain business,31 an order excluding certain portions of a re-
quested passenger bus route,3" 2 a threatened revocation of existing
28Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct.
353, 67 L. Ed. 659.
2 Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct.
70, 74 L. Ed. 233. See also Railroad Com'n of California v. Los Angeles
Ry. Corp., (1929) 280 U. S. 145, 50 Sup. Ct. 71, 74 L. Ed. 234 (challenge
of confiscatory rate order).
3
°Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. CL
353, 67 L. Ed. 659.
31t-erkness v. Irion, (1928) 278 U. S. 92, 49 Sup. Ct 40, 73 L. Ed. 198.
Plaintiff applied to the Louisiana State Commissioner of Conservation for
a permit to operate on his land the business -of extracting carbon black
from natural gas. The statute provided that such permit was necessary.
The permit was refused. Plaintiff started business without the permit and
brought this suit to restrain the commissioner from enforcing the penalty
imposed by the statute for so operating, upon the ground that the refusal
of the permit violated the due process clause of the federal constitution.
Three judges heard the application for interlocutory injunction, and later
denied an injunction and dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction. On
direct appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision as to the dismissal,
saying: "As the bill challenged the validity under the federal constitution
.of an order of an administrative board of the state, the district court had
jurisdiction under section 266 . . .and this court has jurisdiction on direct
appeal."
-
32Grubb v. Public Util. Com'n of Ohio, (1930) 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup.
Ct 374, 74 L. Ed. 972.
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licenses to sell insurance," and an order requiring a carrier to
cease and desist from operating unless it applied for and received
a certificate of convenience and necessity.34
It is not material that the order is within or beyond the au-
thority of the board, commission, or officer,3 or that the court
may be disposed to regard the order as constitutional. Nor is it
material even that the final adjudication establishes the order as
constitutional. 3
For purposes of federal jurisdiction only, and aside from the
question whether, under the section, three judges are necessary,
the challenge of an order for unconstitutionality invokes the juris-
diction of the federal courts.3" In the three"8 cases held not within
the section because no interlocutory injunction was sought, or be-
33 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, (1926) 270 U. S. 426. 46 Sup. Ct.
331, 70 L. Ed. 664. See also Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Conn, (1927)
272 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 88, 71 L. Ed. 243 (threat to revoke license of
foreign insurance company to do local business), and Tyson Bros. & United
Theatres Offices v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.
Ed. 718.
34Ex parte Madden Bros. Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 794, 807, 51 Sup, Ct.
645, 75 L. Ed. 865.
S3Herkness v. Irion, (1928) 278 U. S. 92, 49 Sup. St. 40, 73 L. Ed,
198. See also City of Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., (1920)
251 U. S. 192, 40 Sup. Ct. 123, 64 L. Ed. 221; Bohler v. Calloway, (1925)
267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. 431, 69 L. Ed. 745; Risty v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. Co., (1926) 270 U. S. 378, 46 Sup. Ct. 236, 70 L. Ed. 641. In Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, (1913) 227 U. S. 278, 33 Sup. Ct.
312, 57 L. Ed. 510, the Court stated this principle as follows: ". . , for the
purpose of enforcing the rights guaranteed-by the amendment [U.S. const,
14th amendt.] when it is alleged that a state officer, in virtue of state power,
is doing an act which, if permitted to be done, prima facie would violate the
Amendment, the subject must be tested by assuming that the officer pos-
sessed power, if the act be one which there would not be opportunity to
perform but for the possession of some state authority." Cf. City of Chi-
cago v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 577, 52 Sup. Ct. 2,
76 L. Ed. 501.
36"We find no expression or implication anywhere in the section justi-
fying the assumption that there was an intention on the part of Congress
that the single justice or judge to whom the application for the interlqcu-
tory injunction should be presented need not call to his assistance two
other judges to pass upon the application, in the event that lie was of the
opinion that the claim of the unconstitutionality of the statute was untenable,
On the contrary, the statute evidences the purpose of Congress that the
application for the interlocutory injunction should be heard before the en-
larged court, whether the claim of unconstitutionality be or be not ieri-
torious, as the appeal allowed to this court is from an order denying as
well as from an order granting an injunction." Ex parte Metropolitan
Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575.
37in re Budder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036;
Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct. 105, 71
L. Ed. 273; Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. 8. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L.
Ed. 353.
38See footnote 37.
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cause the application for such relief was abandoned, there was
nevertheless jurisdiction in the federal courts, and these courts rq-
tained the cases for final determination, without, however, any
necessity for three judges. Thus, where the plaintiff complained
that the statute under which the state board was operating %was no
longer in force, and that for that reason the board had no power
to make the order challenged, federal jurisdiction was found;"
where a state officer cancelled plaintiff's authorization to issue
certain types of insurance contracts which the officer erroneously
regarded as contrary to public policy, there was jurisdiction in
the federal court ;"o and where an order affecting insurance rates
was challenged, jurisdiction in the federal court was found.41
Under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, similar to section 266,
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission may also, by
express provision, be challenged in the federal courts, without,
of course, any regard to the validity of the legislation creating the
commission and defining its powers and duties.
Of the nine cases in which orders were challenged under the
section, two were held not within the section merely because no
interlocutory injunction was sought in the one 2 case and because
the prayer for such relief was abandoned in the other.4 3 In the
nine cases arising under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, involving
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme
Court in four4" cases discussed certain acts of the commission
which had been challenged as "orders" and held that they were
not orders.within the meaning of the act, as follows: where the
act of the commission was the certification to the treasury depart-
ment of the amount due certain railroads on an accounting; 2
where the commission included in a certain report a statement of
391n re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036.
40Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273.
4
'Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed.
353. See also Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, (1928) 276 U. S. 245.
48 Sup. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551, in which plaintiff sought to restrain the en-
forcement of a statute imposing a valid tax on busses used in interstate
commerce.
421n re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036.
43Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273.
44See also, for case involving "assessment" under the section, which
was held not an order, footnote 25.
4rGreat Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1928) 277 U. S. 172. 48
Sup. Ct. 466, 72 L. Ed. 838. This %%as an action by tie railway company to
annul certain certificates issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, on
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the amount due certain railroad companies ;40 where the commis-
sion made negative orders dismissing a bill brought by the plaintiff
oil company to recover certain charges exacted by certain car-
riers;4 and where the commission denied a permit to build.""
C. Officers-The question, who is an "officer of the state"
within the 'meaning of the section, was before the court in the
Public National Bank Case,4 9 which case clearly holds that the
the ground that the certificates were "orders" and to restrain action by the
government. The Supreme Court held that the certificates were not
"orders," and stated: "There is in the certificates no direction, no word of
command. They are the recital of a finding of fact."
46United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51
Sup. Ct. 237, 75 L. Ed. 349. In this case a certain report of the Interstate
Commerce Commission was challenged as being an unlawful "order." The
ruling of the three-judge court that the report was an "order" was
reversed on direct appeal, the Supreme Court saying: "The action here
complained of is not in form an order. It is part of a report-an opinion
as distinguished from a mandate. The distinction between an order and a
report has been observed . . .for compelling reasons. . . .No case has been
found in which matter embodied in a report and not followed by a fornal
order has been held to be subject to judicial review."
47Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 235, 51 Sup. Ct.
429, 75 L. Ed. 555. In this case the act of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was its dismissal of plaintiff's bill brought before the commission
to recover certain charges exacted of plaintiffs by certain carriers. Three
judges were called and dismissed the7 bill. On direct appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal below, stating that the action of the Com-
mission was merely a negative one, and therefore, not an order within the
meaning of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. The Court said: "The order ...
simply dismissed the complaint . . . It is plain that the order is negative
both in form and effect ...this language [referring to the provisions of
the Urgent Deficiencies Act] was not intended to apply to purely negative
orders. A negative order which denies relief without more compels nothing
requiring enforcement, and contemplates no action susceptible of being stayed
by an injunction or affected by a decree setting aside, annulling, or suspend-
ing the order." See footnote 113 for further matters covered by the
opinion in this case.
48Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1930) 280 U. S.
469, 50 Sup. Ct, 192, 74 L. Ed. 551, a case quite similar to the Standard
Oil Case, in footnote 47. For an analogous case, arising under section 266,
see Ex parte Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877.
49Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202. Plaintiff bank sought to enjoin the
defendant city officials from collecting taxes assessed against certain prop-
erty owned by the bank, upon the ground that the state law authorizing the
tax was invalid because in conflict with the 14th amendment. Although the
tax was authorized by the statute, it was for the sole use of the city.
The statutory court granted an interlocutory injunction, but at the final
hearing, of its own motion, sent the case back for further proceedings to
the single judge, upon the ground that the suit was against city officials
acting solely for city purposes and that the suit therefore did not challenge
"any officer of such state" within the meaning of the section. This was
sustained by the Supreme Court, for the Court refused mandamus to com-
pel the three judges to re-convene and to function in the case. See also
footnote 136. For other cases involving "officers," see footnote 26.
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officer whose acts are sought to be restrained must be a state
officer or the section vill not apply. This case would seem further
to imply that it must appear that the officer is acting in his official
capacity, on behalf of the state, and in furtherance of its business.
The Court said:
"The persons sued are municipal officers, having no state
functions to perform, but charged only with the duty of collect-
ing and receiving taxes assessed by other city officials in no respect
for the use of the state, but for and in behalf of the city alone."
For these reasons the section was held not to apply. Various
other questions might be suggested in this connection4 0
D. Relief Sought.7-It .may be repeated that the controlling
element in these cases is the relief sought by the plaintiff.," The
section applies if he demands and persists in demanding an inter-
locutory injunction which must be based upon the alleged viola-
tion of the federal constitution. The absence of a prayer for such
relief or its abandonment is the controlling point in four of the
cases, which accordingly were held to be not within the section,
and hence three judges were not necessary.
2. WHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE PLACED UPON THE POWER OF A
SINGLE JUDGE?
The filing of a bill of complaint which lies within the section
invokes the jurisdiction of the statutory court at once. This is
true by virtue of the provisions of the section, which are impera-
tive, and three judges are necessary even though the statute or
order challenged may ultimately be held constitutional ;52 and even
though the court may be of the opinion that the act challenged is
void because in excess of the officer's authority under the state
statute, and hence, in the opinion of the trial court, the constitu-
tionality of the statute is not material ;5 or where the court be-
lieves the question involved is or may become moot."4 The
section reads:
5OFor example: what if the state officer is not acting in his official
capacity? Or is not acting on behalf of the state? Suppose he is acting in
behalf of a municipality? Or, what of a municipal officer acting in behalf
of the state? See also footnote 126.
5MSee footnotes, 9 to 13 inclusive, and Brucker v. Fisher, (C.C.A. bth
Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 759.
52See footnotes 13 and 36.
53See footnotes 31, 35, and 36.
54Ex parte Atlantic Coast Ry. Co., (1928) 279 U. S. 82-, 49 Sup. Ct.
478, 73 L. Ed. 977, in which it is said: "Upon examination of the return to
the rule to show cause, the court finds that the reason given by the re-
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". no interlocutory injunction ...shall be issued or granted
unless the application for the same .. .shall be heard and
determined by three judges .'. . and unless a majority of said
judges shall concur in granting such application. Whenever such
application as aforesaid is presented to a justice . . 'or judge, he
shall immediately call . .. two other judges. . .
It would seem from the language of the section, and from the
decisions, that when a case falls within the section, it lies solely
within the jurisdiction.of three judges sitting as a district court,
except for the express and limited function of a single judge
hereinafter discussed. Since the jurisdiction of the statutory
court of three judges is unlimited in cases within the section, such
a court can make any disposition of the case. This alone would
exclude any idea of similar jurisdiction of a single judge. The
jurisdiction of the statutory court, so invoked, cannot be defeated
by any act of a single judge.51
Under the terms of the original section, the Act of June 18,
1910, the three judges were required to hear the application for
interlocutory injunction. Some question arose in practice as to
whether this requirement extended to the final hearing and dispo-
sition of the case. An amendment to the section, passed in 1925,
expressly so provides. "6
So far as the wording of the section alone is concerned, it
amounts to a grant of power to the statutory court and a with-
spondent, the district judge for the northern district of Florida, that the
case is likely to become moot, are not sufficient to justify his failure, im-
mediately upon application, to call to his assistance two other judges." Cf.
Grubb v. Public Util. Com'n of Ohio, (1930) 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374,
74 L. Ed. 972, a case within the concurrent jurisdiction of both federal and
state courts. After a three-judge federal district court had granted an
interlocutory injunction, a suit was begun and terminated in the state court,
in which suit the validity of the commission's order was sustained. The
three judges then vacated their interlocutory injunction and dismissed the
suit. On direct appeal, this action was affirmed. See footnote 2, for provi-
sions of section 266 providing for holding in abeyance a suit under the
section, pending litigation in the state courts. Cf. with these cases, the
cases of Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup.
Ct. 353, 67 L. Ed. 659, and Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, (1926) 270
U. S.426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664, and In re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S.
461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036. Cf. United Drug Co. v. Graves, (D.C.
Ala. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 808, in which it was held that a single judge could
refuse to convene the statutory court, where he was of the opinion that the
bill of complaint did not support the contention that the statute complained
of was in conflict with the federal constitution or laws.
55See footnotes 5, 12, 16, 36 and text just preceding footnote 78. See
also Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct.
70, 74 L. Ed. 233.
56The 1925 amendment is the last sentence in the present section. See
footnote 2 for full text.
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drawal of such power from the single judge. No limitation on the
power of the three-judge court is found in the section, unless the
requirement that the three judges all be present at the final hearing
may be called a limitation. 57 Any restrictions on the power of the
statutory court must be sought outside of the section. One such
limitation is found in the Virginian Rail-way Case,58 in which the
Supreme Court announces a rule limiting the power of such court
to grant a stay pending appeal from a final decree denying an
injunction.
Probably the most important provision in the section is the re-
striction placed upon the powers of a single judge holding a
district court, who is confronted with a bill of complaint lying
within the section. The object of the section is clearly to restrict
the power of such a single judge. All power to hear or determine
an application for interlocutory injunction is expressly taken away
in so many words. It is stated expressly that such relief can be
granted only by a three-judge court. It is clear that a single
57Note also the provision in the section that no relief may be granted
until after the notice and hearing provided by the section.
5sirginian Railway Co. v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 658, 47
Sup. Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463: "An application to suspend the operation of
the Commission's order pending an appeal from the final decree dismissing
the bill on the merit calls for the exercise of discretion under circumstances
essentially different from those which obtain when the application for a
stay is made prior to a hearing of the application for an interlocutory in-
junction, or after the hearing thereon but before the decision.... To
justify a stay pending an appeal from a final decree refusing an injunction
additional facts must be shown. . . . It must appear either that the District
Court entertains a serious doubt as to the correctness of its own decision
or that the decision depends upon a question of law on which there is a
conflict among the courts of the several circuits, or that some other special
reason exists why the order of the commission ought not to be operative
until its validity can be considered by this court." For other cases involv-
ing stays and the power to grant them pending appeal, see the following
cases, in which the orders of the statutory court, granting such stays, were
affirmed: Herkness v. Irion, (1928) 278 U. S. 92, 49 Sup. Ct. 40, 73 L. Ed.
198; Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, (1931) 2 U. S. 501, 51
Sup. Ct. 505, 75 L. Ed. 692. See also the Court's footnote No. 3 in
Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup. CL
222, 71 L. Ed. 463, discussed supra. As to the power of the single judge to
grant stays, see footnote 72 and text. See also Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 781, 49 Sup. Ct. 492, 73 L. Ed. 954, in
which the Supreme Court criticized the failure of the statutory court to
make findings and reversed its action in refusing to award restitution of
certain funds. See also, Railroad Commission v. faxcy, (1930) 281
U. S. 82, 50 Sup. Ct. 228, 74 L. Ed. 717. Cf. Mitchell v. Penney Stores,
(1931) 284 U. S. 576, 52 Sup. Ct. 27, 76 L. Ed. 500, in which the statutory
court, without a written opinion, had granted an interlocutory injunction
to be in effect until the final hearing. The state challenged this action of
the court as being an abuse of discretion and appealed directly to the Supreme
.Court, which dismissed the appeal.
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judge never can grant an interlocutory injunction in those cases
which fall within the section."
But can he deny such relief? This more vexatious question
arises, if for no other reason, because the language of the section
does not expressly deny this power to the single judge, and
because, in practice, single judges often have attempted, directly
or indirectly, to deny such relief.0 0
It is suggested that the answer to this question must be: No.
This would seem to follow from the express denial of his power
to grant such relief, and because the power to grant it is lodged
exclusively in the statutory court of three judges. But other
portions of the section have a bearing on this question. It is
provided:
"'Whenever such application as aforesaid is presented to a jus-
tice ... or judge, he shall immediately call to his assistance to hear
and determine the application . . . two other judges. The hearing
shall be given precedence and shall be in every way expedited, and
be assigned for hearing at the earliest practicable day after the
expiration of the notice. .... An appeal may be taken direct to
the Supreme Court of the United States from the order granting
or denying . . . an interlocutory injunction. . . . The requirement
respecting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the
final hearing in any suit . . . and direct appeal to the Supreme
Court may be taken from a final decree granting or denying a
permanent injunction in such suit."' 1
This language, considered with the balance of the section, and
the object sought to be accomplished by Congress, 0 2 leads to the
conclusion that the section was intended to withdraw from a single
judge, sitting as a district court, the power to deny as well as the
power to grant such relief. If this be not true, what necessity is
there for the requirement that upon the filing of the bill the single
59Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, (1922)
260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217.
"Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct.
600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Ex parte Atlantic Coast Ry. Co., (1928) 279 U. S.
822, 49 Sup. Ct. 478, 73 L. Ed. 977; Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,(1929) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233; Stratton v. St. Louis,
S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71; Ex parte
Madden Bros. Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 794, 807, 51 Sup. Ct. 645, 75 L. Ed.
865.
61Italics ours. [Ed.]62
"Congress realized that in requiring the presence of three judges, of
whom one must be a.justice of this court, or a circuit judge, it was !in-
posing a severe burden upon the federal courts. The burden was imposed
because Congress deemed it unseemly that a single judge should have the
power to suspend legislation enacted by a state." Ex parte Collins, (1928)
277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990. See also footnote 5 and text.
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judge "shall immediately" call in two other judges? Does "imi-
mediately" mean "at once," or is it to be construed to mean after
some lapse of time, during which the single judge is unhamnpered
in entertaining and acting upon applications for similar relief
in other forms, or motions going to the merits or to the jurisdic-
tion? The section requires that he call two other judges to his
assistance to "hear and determine" the application. This cannot
be construed to permit the single judge to determine alone, when
he intends to deny the relief sought, any more than he can de-
termine alone when he intends to grant the interlocutory injunction.
In the face of this language, 3 is the calling of two other judges
a matter of discretion of the single judge? May he require two
other judges to come to his assistance when he regards the case
difficult, and dispense with them when he thinks it easy 44
Again, what. need is there to expedite the hearing before three
judges, if the single judge is to be permitted to exercise their
powers? There can be no question that Congress was well aware
that the convening of the statutory court requires, and in practice
always takes, much more time than is necessary to get action by
a single judge. Congress not only knew this, but it suggested,
recognized and provided for it expressly in the section. The
desirability of having three judges pass on the questions raised
was regarded so highly that Congress sought by the terms of the
section to hasten the assembly of the statutory court, while still
insisting upon the presence of three judges. It would appear from
the language in some of the decided cases, moreover, that Congress
may not have been averse to some slight delay, in order to pre-
vent the too hasty or improvident granting of injunctions.0 3 This
appears also from the provision in the section 0 requiring the giv-
ing of notice to certain state officials and the provision that no
63For full text of section, see footnote 2. See also the discussion in
Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8,
75 L. Ed. 71.
64See footnote 36; also, footnotes 52 to 54 inclusive.
65The wording of the section leaves no doubt that Congress was by
provisions ex industria seeking to make interference by interlocutory in-
junction from a federal -court with the enforcement of state legislation
regularly enacted and in the course of execution, a matter of the adequate
and the full deliberation which the presence of three judges . .. w%-as likely
to secure. It was to prevent the improvident granting of such injunctions
by a single judge . . . Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Com'n, (1922) 260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217.
66For full text see footnote 2. Observe the numerous provisions mak-
ing for delay. See also footnote 67.
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relief shall be granted by way of interlocutory or permanent in-
junction except after such notice67 and hearing.
The language of the section expressly provides for a final hear-
ing before three judges, and for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from the action of these judges, whether the injunction be
granted or denied. But, if the suit may be terminated by a single
judge, there would be no final hearing for three judges. More-
over, the direct appeal to the Supreme Court, which is the only
method of review provided within the section, contemplates only
action of three judges, and the right of appeal exists only from
the action of three judges. There are no provisions whatever
in the section for the review of the action of a single judge, and
if the scope and purpose of the section are borne in mind, there
is no need for such provision because any error of the single
judge in the course of his acting on a prayer for a temporary
restraining order can and will be reviewed by the statutory court,
the assembling of which is expedited by the terms of the section.
The conclusion would seem irresistible that it was not intended
by Congress that a single judge would or could perform those
functions which were of such importance as to require three
judges and in which review by the highest court in the land was
so expedited as provided by the section. It would be absurd to
say that such review was unnecessary when one judge acted, but
that it would be necessary when three judges acted, even though
pursuant to the section one of the three judges was a circuit judge.
It is submitted that there is nothing in the section or in the de-
cisions which would suggest that Congress at any time intended
or expected a single judge to perform the function which the
section requires to be performed by three judges, or that the
single judge could nullify the legislation by preventing action by
the statutory court. 8
It is clear, however, that even in cases within the section, and
hence requiring three judges, a single judge, by express provisions
of the section, may also function-that he may pass upon an
application for a temporary restraining .order. Moreover, in
67Cf. Webster v. Fall, (1925) 266 U. S. 507, 45 Sup. Ct. 148, 69 L. Ed.
411, in which the Supreme Court set aside the decisions below on the
ground that the secretary of the interior had not been served with notice,
although the assistant secretary had been so notified. This case was not
brought under either section 266 or the Urgent Deficiencies Act, but was
brought under section 2047 of the Revised Statutes.
68Cf. footnote 5.
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actual practice, such relief may be and often is granted ex parte.
The section provides:
"'... if of opinion that irreparable loss or damage would
result to the complainant unless a temporary restraining order is
granted, any justice of the Supreme Court, or any circuit or dis-
trict judge, may grant such temporary restraining order at any
time before such hearing and determination of the application for
an interlocutory injunction, but such restraining order shall re-
main in force only until the hearing and determination of the appli-
cation for an interlocutory injunction...."69
It may be suggested that a temporary restraining order,
granted by a single judge, especially if granted ex parte, is perhaps
even more in the nature of hasty and improvident interference by
the federal courts with the sovereign states than an interlocutory
injunction granted by three judges after notice and hearing. But
Congress must have been aware of the possibility of the existence
of those circumstances in which irreparable injury to individuals
in the bona fide exercise of rights guaranteed by the federal con-
stitution might follow state action, and, while deprecating the
"'possible unnecessary conflict between federal and state author-
ity,"7 felt is necessary to protect the individual in the enjoyment
of such rights. But since the three judges are seldom, if ever.
immediately available, Congress has authorized the single judge
to take temporary action, although such action is limited to the
shortest time practicable in convening the statutory court.
Insofar as a motion for a temporary restraining order may be
made before a single judge, it is indispensable that lie shall have
power to determine, in exercising his discretion in granting or
denying such relief, whether for such purpose the suit is Within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and whether the circumn-
stances exhibited by the bill present those conditions contemplated
as "irreparable loss or damage" within the meaning of the section.
He may, and ordinarily would, pass incidentally on the good faith
of plaintiff or its absence in bringing the suit and on the question
whether or not a substantial claim of unconstitutionality is pre-
sented. Yet all these factors are weighed and passed upon by
the single judge for one purpose only, that is, as the basis for
granting'or denying the temporary restraining order. An adverse
decision by him on these questions can be used only to deny
69ltalics ours. [Ed.]
-oCumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Coi'n, (1922)
260 U. S. 212. 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217.
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the temporary relief; it cannot affect the final disposition of the
case, for such final disposition is solely within the power of the
three-judge court. It might be said that in so passing on the
application for a temporary restraining order, the single judge
exercises only a sort of pre-delegated authority on behalf of the
statutory court of which, in the usual course, he will be a member.
In defining the powers of a single judge in such matters the
Supreme Court has aided Congress materially by construing the
section in those cases in which the question of the applicability of
the section was involved. From these decisions it would appear
that the function and powers of the single judge are confined to
the initial and limited act of passing on a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and discharging the duty of calling two other
judges. He may grant or deny such temporary order, but no
more.7 1 The language of the section in authorizing such action
by the single judge does not confer or permit all of the ordinary
powers of a court of equity, for, in the first place, such temporary
relief can be granted only under the circumstances prescribed in
the section, and, in the second place, such order, if granted, is
limited as to time by the terms of the section rather than by the
discretion of the single judge. The order can be effective only
until the statutory court is convened, and when that court acts the
restraining order ceases to be of any force or effect.
The significance of the provision that an order for temporary
restraint can be made only before the hearing on the interlocutory
injunction by the statutory court is found in the Cumberland
Case,7 2 in which a single judge, after the three-judge court had
denied an interlocutory injunction, attempted to continue in effect
the temporary restraining order which he had granted before the
hearing by the three judges. His action in so continuing his
order was held to be unauthorized and wholly void.
The power of the single judge would seem, therefore, to be
confined to the one act of granting or denying a temporary re-
7"Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct,
600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, (1926) 272
U. S. 658, 47 Sup. Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463; Cumberland- Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, (1922) 260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67
L. Ed. 217; Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 20 U. S. 142, 50
Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233; Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930)
282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71; Ex parte Madden Bros., Inc.,(1931) 283 U. S. 794, 807, 51 Sup. Ct. 645, 75 L. Ed. 865.
"-Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Corn'n, (1922)
260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217. See also footnotes 5 and 36.
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straining order. It has been held that he cannot do both suc-
cessively, for, having granted such relief, he has been held to be
without jurisdiction later to vacate, amend, or otherwise affect his
order or to entertain any motion with respect to it.?- It seems he
gets no "second shot" at it; he may not even change his mind
and set the order aside, since once he has acted, he is without
jurisdiction.74
It has been held that a single judge, prior to the convening of
the statutory court, cannot entertain or act upon a motion going
to the merits." Can he entertain and act on a motion going to
the jurisdiction of the subject-matter? There has been no case,
until the recent Madden Case-I in which this question was squarely
raised, and there is no adequate discussion of this question in the
decisions to date. But on the basis of the case just mentioned
and on principle, it is submitted that the proper and only answer
to the foregoing question is: No. Since the question of jurisdic-
tion is an essential element of the application for relief tinder the
section in an equitable proceeding, and since the granting or, as
indicated above, the denying of an interlocutory injunction is
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the statutory court, it would
seem that a single judge cannot act on a motion going to the
jurisdiction. All the reasons indicated by the Supreme Court in
holding that he may not pass on motions going to the merits apply
with equal force, it is submitted, to deny the power to pass on
motions going to the jurisdiction. Such a motion necessarily in-
volves, in an equitable suit, a consideration of factors which are
inseparable from the merits. In passing on such a motion, the
73See cases cited in footnote 71.
74See Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31
Sup. Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 280
U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233, and cases cited in footnote 71.
75.Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comnn, (1922)
260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217; Ex parte Metropolitan Water
Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Ex parte Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., (1919) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233:
Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8,
75 L. Ed. 71.
76Ex parte Madden Bros., Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 794, 807, 51 Sup. Ct.
645, -75 L. Ed. 865. In this case an order of a state board was challenged as
unconstitutional. A single judge granted a temporary restraining order.
Later, another single judge entertained and allowed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction of the court. On mandamus proceedings, the singlejudge was reversed by the Supreme Court. It is to be regretted that in
this case a memorandum opinion only was given. The result, however,
would seem to have settled the question adversely to the e.gistence of such
power in the single judge.
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court must determine whether the bill presents a sufficient showing
for equitable relief, and this necessarily involves some considera-
tion of the validity of the act challenged, a preliminary determina-
tion of the facts, and of the question of whether or not an adequate
remedy at law is available.
It is obvious that a decision by the single judge that there is
no jurisdiction would prevent the question ofjurisdiction ever
reaching the three-judge court, would prevent its determination
of the application for interlocutory injunction, would dispose
finally of the case, and would vacate any temporary restraining
order previously issued. The effect of a decision on such a mo-
tion is identical with a decision on the merits and operates to
substitute the action of the single judge for that of the three
judges, and action by him and the circuit court of appeals for
that of the statutory court and the Supreme Court." There can
be no distinction in principle or in effect between action of the
single judge on the merits and his action on motions as to the
jurisdiction.
When a case falls within the section, therefore, it is submitted
that a single judge cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the statutory
court or prevent determination by it of the questions presentel,
whether as to the relief sought. or as to the merits, or as to the
jurisdiction. This is true regardless of the fact that a temporary
restraining order is sought or is not sought, and, if sought, re-
gardless of whether it is allowed or not; and regardless, further,
of what motion is attempted to be brought before the judge,
whether attacking the merits or the jurisdiction. In those cases
where no temporary restraining order is sought, or where if
sought it is denied, the single judge must, nevertheless, call in two
other judges and leave to the statutory court the determination of
the application for interlocutory injunction and the final disposi-
tion of the case. In such cases the state and its officers cannot be
prejudiced by the necessity for waiting for the assembling of
these judges, for there is no restraint upon the state. In those
cases where the temporary restraint is sought and granted, the
state is inconvenienced as little as possible because the convening
of the statutory court is expedited and the restraint imposed by
the single judge can operate only until the three judges assemble.7 8
"7See Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10. 51
Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71.
8SSee discussion supra, and footnotes 6. and 70 to 74, inclusive.
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The action of a single judge was questioned and review sought
in the Supreme Court in ten cases; once on direct appeal, where
that remedy was held improper, the appeal being dismissed ;v' and
ten"° times on mandamus, in fours' of which mandamus was
denied, and in six the writ was granted. In addition, the single
jjidge needlessly called in two other judges in two cases" both of
which were properly referred back to him. In another case" the
single judge called in two others who retained and determined
the case finally, although one judge could and should have func-
tioned alone, as the case was not within the section. However,
this was held not error on the part of the three judges. To these
cases might be added the four cases involving orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, which were held not to be within
the act. In all the cases in which a single judge functioned, in-
cluding the teft cases in which review was sought in the Supreme
Court, the single judge acted correctly four"' times and errone-
ously thiteen 5 times.
79Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.. (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273.
SOEx parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup. Ct.
600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Com'n, (1922) 260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217; in re Buder,
(1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036: Ex parte Williams,
(1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877; Ex parte Collins,
(1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990; Ex parte Atlantic
Coast Ry. Co., (1928) 279 U. S. 822, 49 Sup. Ct. 478, 73 L. Ed. 977; Ex
parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L.
Ed. 233; Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed.
353; Ex parte Madden Bros., Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 807, 51 Sup. Ct. 645,
75 L. Ed. 865; and indirectly in Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co.,
(1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71.
8 In re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036;
Ex parte Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877;
Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990;
Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83. 74 L. Ed. 353.
82Ex parte Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed.
877; Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202.
s3Smith -. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed.
699. S4That is, assuming that the dismissal of an appeal, or the denial of a
writ of mandamus, is equivalent to holding that the lower court acted
properly and reached a correct result. This is, however, not necessarily true.
Suppose, for example, the lower court is wrong in the conclusion on the
merits, yet, because the case is not within the section, direct appeal does
not lie to the Supreme Court; the dismissal of the appeal or denial of a
writ of mandamus would therefore establish only the inapplicability of
the section. The resort of the Supreme Court rather than to the circuit
court of appeals would be the precise reason for the action of dismissing or
denying by the Supreme Court. The correctness or error of the lower
court's decision on the merits might but ordinarily would not be passed
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The action of the statutory three-judge court was questioned
and review sought in the Supreme Court in nineteen cases, ten °
under the section, and nine under the act. Of the ten cases under
the section, review was sought by direct appeal to the Supreme
Court in eight cases, five s8 of which were affirmed or the appeal
upon (see footnote 137) by the Supreme Court (Cf. footnotes 107 and 120)
and would be left for review and correction by the court having juris-
diction of the appeal, viz., the circuit court of appeals. See also footnotes
79 and 81.
85Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup,
Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Com'n, (1922) 260 U. S. 212, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Ed. 217; Smith
v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed. 699; Ex parte
Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877; Ex parte
The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct.
43, 73 L. Ed. 202; Ex parte Atlantic Coast Ry. Co., (1928) 279 U. S.
822, 49 Sup. Ct. 478, 73 L. Ed. 977; Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,(1929) 280 U. S. 142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233; Stratton v. St. Louis,
S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71 ; Ex parte
Madden Bros., Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 807, 51 Sup. Ct. 645, 75 L. Ed. 865.
And under the Urgent Deficiencies Act: Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United
States, (1928) 277 U. S. 172, 48 Sup. Ct. 466, 72 L. Ed. 838; United States
v. Atlantic, B. & C. R. Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 237, 75 L. Ed.
349; Standard Oil Co. v United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 235, 51 Sup. Ct.
429, 75 L. Ed. 555; Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1930)
280 U. S. 469, 50 Sup. Ct. 192, 74 L. Ed. 551. On the question of "error,"
see text at footnotes 113 and 127.
86Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct.
353, 67 L. Ed. 659; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, (1926) 270 U. S.
426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664; Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S.
388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed. 699; Clark v. Poor, (1927) 274 U. S. 554,
47 Sup. Ct. 702, 71 L. Ed. 1200; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, (1928)
276 U. S. 245, 48 Sup. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551; Ex parte Williams, (1928)
277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877; Herkness v. Irion, (1928) 278
U. S. 92, 49 Sup. Ct. 40, 73 L. Ed. 198; Ex parte The Public National
Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202;
Dohany v. Rogers, (1930) 281 U. S. 362, 50 Sul. Ct. 299, 74 L. Ed. 904;
Grubb v. Public Util. Com'n of Ohio, (1930) 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup, Ct.
374, 74 L. Ed. 972. For an additional case see Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway,(1929) 279 U. S. 813, 49 Sup. Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972, in which the Supreme
Court reversed the statutory court which had denied an interlocutory in-junction. The Supreme Court announced the broad rule covering such
situations as follows: "Where the questions presented by an al)plcation
for an interlocutory injunction are grave, and the injury to the moving
party will be certain and irreparable if the application be denied and the
final decree be in his favor, while if the injunction be granted the injury
to opposing party, even if the final decree be in his favor, will be incon-
siderable, or may be adequately indemnified by a bond, the injunction usually
will be granted." Cf. Northport Power & Light Co. v. Hartley, (1931) 283
U. S. 568, 51 Sup. Ct. 581, 75 L. Ed. 811.
87Dismissal: Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388. 47 Sup. Ct. 385,
71 L. Ed. 699; cases affirmed: Clark v. Poor, (1927) 274 U. S. 554, 47
Sup. Ct. 702, 71 L. Ed. 1200; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, (1928)
276 U. S. 245, 48 Sup. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551; Dohany v. Rogers, (1930)
281 U. S. 362, 50 Sup. Ct. 299, 74 L. Ed. 904; Grubb v. Public Util. Com'n
of Ohio, (1930) 281 U. S. 470. 50 Sup. Ct. 374, 74 L. Ed. 972. As to the
possible interpretation of a dismissal of an appeal, see footnote 84.
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dismissed, and threess were reversed. Mandamus was used once"
against the statutory court and denied. In the nine cases under
the act, the three-judge court was affirmed five 0 times, and re-
versed four." The three judges, therefore, acted correctly twelve;*
times and erroneously seven 3 times. It may be noted that this
court properly referred two9 4 cases back to the single judge, but
erroneously failed to do so in a third case. 3 These cases include
the four in which three judges needlessly functioned, because the
cases were held not to be within the act.
The circuit court of appeals acted once90 in a case within sec-
tion 266 and, although it reached the correct result, was held to
have acted without jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the
circuit court by the Supreme Court with directions to dismiss for
lack of jurdisdiction.
The action of the lower federal courts in the twenty-nine cases,
including the circuit court of appeals, the statutory three-judge
8SOklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct.
353, 67 L. Ed. 659; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, (1926) 270 U. S.
426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664; Herkness v. Irion, (1928) 278 U. S.
92, 49 Sup. Ct. 40, 73 L. Ed. 198.
89Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202.
9OGreat Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1928) 277 U. S. 172. 48
Sup. Ct. 466, 72 L. Ed. 838; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1931) 283
,U. S. 235, 51 Sup. Ct. 429, 75 L. Ed. 555; Merchants Warehouse Co. v.
United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 501, 51 Sup. Ct. 505, 75 L. Ed. 692; Georgia
Pub. Serv. Com'n v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 765, 51 Sup. Ct. 619.
75 L. Ed. 821; State of Alabama v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 776,
51 Sup. Ct. 623, 75 L. Ed. 827.
91Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup.
Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463; United States v. Erie Ry. Co., (1929) 280 U. S.
98, 50 Sup. Ct. 51, 74 L. Ed. 187; Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United
States, (1930) 280 U. S. 469, 50 Sup. Ct. 192, 74 L. Ed. 551; United States
v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 237, 75 L.
Ed. 349.92Five cases affirmed or appeal dismissed, see footnote 87. Two cases
properly referred back to one judge, see footnote 82; all seven cases being
under the section. Five cases under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. affirmed.
see footnote 90. As to the effect of a dismissal, see footnote 84.
93Three reversals on direct appeal under the section, see footnote 88;
and four under the act, see footnote 91. To these should be added the Wil-
son Case, in which three judges functioned needlessly, see footnotes 112,
127 and text
94See footnote 82.
95See footnote 83.
96Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup.
Ct 8, 75 L. Ed. 71. That is, once in those cases which reached the Su-
preme Court. For a case within the section which was appealed to the
circuit court of appeals from a final decree of permanent injunction granted
by the statutory three-judge court, see Brucker v. Fisher, (C.C.A. oth Cir.
1931) 49 F. (2d) 759. The appeal was dismissed by the circuit court for
lack of jurisdiction.
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district court, and the district court as ordinarily constituted by
one judge, was therefore correct in sixteen cases and erroneous in
fourteen cases, 97 not including as errors those cases in which
three judges functioned needlessly.
3. REVIEW PROVIDED IN TI-E SECTION
The only method of review provided within the section is
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the action of the statu-
tory three-judge district courtY5 If the case falls within the
section, three judges are necessary and have exclusive jurisdiction.
The situation is that for which the expedited form of review is
provided.
No provision for appeal, or for review in any manner, is made
within the section for the situation where three judges should have
been convened but were not."9 Nor are there any provisions
within the section for the review of the action of a single judge.
The obvious reason is that a single judge never can take, in con-
templation of the section, that action which may be taken only by
three judges and for which the expedited form of review in the
Supreme Court by direct appeal is provided. To the extent that
a single judge may function in suits within the section, that is,
in passing on prayers for temporary relief, no review is provided,'
nor is any necessary, for reasons discussed above. If the case falls
within the section, the single judge is restricted to granting or
denying any temporary relief requested and to discharging the
duty of convening the statutory court. If for any reason the
single judge refuses to call in the other two judges, or otherwise
exceeds his powers under the section when three judges are not
97In the Stratton Case, (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71
two courts erred, viz: the circuit court of appeals and the single district
judge. See also footnote 114 and text. As to the interpretation of a disnis-
sal of an appeal or denial of mandamus by the Supreme Court. see footnote
84. As to the question of what action of the lower court is error, see foot-
notes 113, 127 and text.
9 8Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317. 47 Sup. Ct.
105. 71 L. Ed. 273; "The right [of direct appeal to the Supreme Court]
exists only in cases falling within the provisions enumerated in that sec-
tion [266] as amended. Otherwise the case must go in the first instance to
the circuit court of appeals, and may come here only on review of that
court's action."
9 Stratton v. St. Louis. S. W. Ry. Co.. (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup.
Ct. 8. 75 L. Ed. 71. See also: Suncrest Lumber Co. v. Park Commission,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 823, and Crescent Mfg. Co, v. Wilson,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 262, 265.
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assembled, or after such court has assembled and functioned, the
proper remedy is to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the single judge to call in two other judges
and/or to correct other error.10 °
If the case does not fall within the section, there is no neces-
sity for the expedited form of review, and the decisions of the
single judge, who may in such cases proceed in the ordinary course
to full and. final determination of the case, will be reviewed in due
course, under other applicable statutes, in the circuit court of
appeals. Thus, where no interlocutory injunction is sought, or
where if originally sought it is abandoned, a single judge may
decide the case on the merits,' 0 ' and appeal may be taken, in the
first instance, only to the circuit court of appeals. "' The case
may reach the Supreme Court only indirectly upon review of the
action of the circuit court of appeals.
In the twenty-nine cases discussed herein only two forms of
review were used to secure review by the Supreme Court, direct
appeal and mandamus. The former was used in eighteen cases,
nine under the section, and nine under the act. Under section 266,
direct appeal was used improperly once0 3 against a single judge,
and once'04 against three judges, in both of which cases the appeal
was dismissed. The other cases in which direct appeal was used
were all against three judges, the procedure being held proper,
although there were three reversals. Under the Urgent Deficien-
cies Act, all nine were appealed directly'0 ' from the action of
three judges, although four cases were held not within the act.
Mandamus was used in eleven cases, all under the section. This
lOOEx parte 'Metropolitan Water Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 539, 31 Sup.
Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575; Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1929) 280 U. S.
142, 50 Sup. Ct. 70, 74 L. Ed. 233; Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co.,(1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71; Ex parte Madden Bros.,
Inc., (1931) 283 U. S. 807, 51 Sup. Ct. 645, 75 L. Ed. 865. See also foot-
note 5.
101Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273; In re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70
L. Ed. 1036; Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385. 71 L.
Ed. 699; Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed.
353; and see also footnotes 9 to 13, inclusive. See also the language of the
Court in the -Stratton Case in footnotes 9 and 106. See also Public Serv.
Com'n v. Batesville Tel. Co., (1931) 52 Sup. Ct. 1.
lo-See footnote 98, and Stratton Case, footnote 106.
'
03Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273.
1O4Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed.
699. :1°5See "footnote 1, as to review under the Urgent Deficiencies Act.
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remedy was denied in a case in which it was attempted against
three judges. It was denied in four cases in which it was at-
tempted against a single judge. Mandamus was granted in six
cases against a single judge.
The form of review is so closely dependent upon the question
whether the section applies at all that it may be assumed that much
of the current confusion as to the proper procedure results, un-
doubtedly, from confusion as to the applicability of the section. It
is clear that if the section does apply and three judges do function,
review in the Supreme Court lies by direct appeal, and that such
direct appeal is the exclusive remedy. Mandamus will lie only
where the remedy by appeal is not available. 00
4. VIHAT COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OF CASES WITHIN THE
SECTION ?
Where the case is within the section, and from the outset there
is no question on this point, the further question, as to which
courts have jurisdiction, is relatively simple. This is even more
simple and obvious where in addition the subsequent course of
the case is entirely within the letter and spirit of the section, in
that the judges construe the section correctly as to their own
powers thereunder and the decisions on the questions involved are
also correct. But, in practice, the question of the applicability
of the section may not be determined until final disposition of
the case is announced by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the
decisions of the courts cannot always be anticipated with that
degree of certainty which will enable cbunsel to feel absolutely sure
he is on the right track.
For the purpose of determining what courts have jurisdiction
of a given case, it may be well to divide the twenty-nine cases
discussed herein into two groups; one, including those cases held
to be within the section or the Act; the other, the cases held not
to be within it.
A. Cases Within the Section.-Under the provisions of the
section, cases within it are solely within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal district court constituted by three judges and
of the Supreme Court, the former having exclusive original
10"This remedy (mandamus) would not be available if there were a
remedy by appeal." Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282
U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71, in which the Court cites other
cases on the point.
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jurisdiction, the latter having exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The
significant, although obvious, point is that the circuit court of
appeals is necessarily eliminated from any and all jurisdiction of
such cases. Only one'0 7 of the twenty-nine cases wvas brought to
that court. This case came to the circuit court by appeals from
an order of a district court of one judge which had dismissed the
bill of complaint on the merits. The circuit court reversed the
lower court. On appeal from this decision of the circuit court to
the Supreme Court, the former was reversed with directions to
dismiss the appeal from the district court for lack of jurisdiction
of the circuit court. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court in the same
proceeding, in effect, granted mandamus against the single district
judge, by ordering him to vacate his order of dismissal and re-
quiring him to call in two other judges in compliance with section
266, it is apparent that.the circuit court's decision wvas correct on
the merits but was error as an assumption of appellate jurisdic-
tion which it did not have because the case was within the section.
The powers and duties of the district court with respect to
cases within the section have been discussed above as well as the
extent of its jurisdiction and the functions of the single judge and
of the three judges. There has also been some discussion relative
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but it is proposed to con-
sider this point in greater detail. By express provision of the
section and by judicial construction thereof, there is a condition
precedent to the vesting of jurisdiction in such cases in the Su-
preme Court. Although, as has been stated, the Supreme Court
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction, that jurisdiction under the
section does not arise unless the action of three judges is the
subject-matter of the appeal. The Court has itself imposed an
additional requirement, namely, that such action by three judges
'
0 7Stratton v. St Louis,.S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup.Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71. See also footnote 83. Cf. action of the circuit court
of appeals in a case not within either the section or the Urgent Deficien-
cies Act,. but within section 238 of the Judicial Code, W. T. Waggoner
Estate v. Wichita County, (1927) 273 U. S. 113, 47 Sup. Ct. 271, 71 L. Ed.
566, in which the Supreme Court held that the action of the circuit court
of appeals was unauthorized and without jurisdiction because under sec-
tion 238 review lay only by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. In this case
too, the Supreme Court dispensed with needless formality and delay by de-
termining the case rather than sending it back to the circuit court of ap-
peals to be dismissed and then requiring the appellant to prosecute a new
appeal to the Supreme Court. For other facts in this case, see footnote
112. For cases on similar action of the Supreme Court, see footnote 120.
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must have been action which they could properly take.108 It
would seem, therefore, that direct appeal will not lie from the
action of three judges who have needlessly functioned, and such
appeal will not lie in any case to correct the action of a single
judge." 9 Where three judges should have acted but did not be-
cause they were not convened or because the single judge at-
tempted to dispose of the case, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be invoked only by proceedings in mandamus directed
against the single judge."" While the section provides only one
method of review, that is, direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of that Court may be invoked also by mandamus, a
method arising from practical necessity and not allowed where the
former remedy is available.""
B. Cases not Within the Section.-So far as Section 266 or
the Urgent Deficiencies Act are concerned, in cases not within
their provisions three judges are not necessary, and there is no
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the
district court. 1
12
10SMoore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273; Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup, Ct.
385, 71 L. Ed. 699; Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York,
(1928) .278 U. S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202; Hobbs v. Pollock,
(1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 353; Stratton v. St. Louis,
S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71. And
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act: Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United
States, (1928) 277 U. S. 172, 48 Sup. Ct. 466, 72 L. Ed. 838; United States
v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 237, 75
L. Ed. 349; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 235, 51
Sup. Ct. 429, 75 L. Ed. 555. In Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. the Su-
preme Court of its own motion issued its rule to appellant to show cause
why his direct appeal from a decree of permanent injunction issued by a
single judge should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court. For further facts in this case, see footnote 98,
'
09Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Su. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273. See also Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930)
282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71.
lloSee discussion infra and footnote 111. For the situation where
three judges are convened but refuse to act in the case, see footnotes 129
to 131 inclusive and text.
"Stratton v. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup.
Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 71. See also footnotes 106 and 127.
"i'Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed.
699. That is, jurisdiction under section 266 or under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act. The Supreme Court may have jurisdiction of a case under other
statutes, for example, under section 238 of the Judicial Code, which pro-
vided, before amendment, for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
the federal district courts, when the jurisdiction of the latter was invoked
on constitutiopal questions. Such a case is W. T. Waggoner Estate v.
Wichita County, (1927) 273 U. S. 113, 47 Sup. Ct. 271, 71 L. Ed. 566, in
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5. CASES IN W1¥HICH THE APPLICATION OF TIE SECTION IS
QUESTIONED
Cases in good faith claimed to be within the section may ulti-
mately be held not to be within it. Since the application of the
section is itself a question to be determined by the court and may
which the appeal was erroneously taken to the circuit court of appeals. In
the review of that court's action, the Supreme Court said:
". .. The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked on the sole
ground that substantial constitutional questions were involved. Hence a
direct appeal should have been taken to this court. Judicial Code, section
238. . . . Having been erroneously brought to the circuit court of appeals,
the case should have been transferred to this court. ... But ... the present
appeal will operate effectively to lodge the case in this case for its decision,
without the needless ceremony of remanding the case to the circuit court
of appeals to enable that court to transfer it back to us for a second con-
sideration." The same right of a direct appeal wvas allowed under section
238, in a criminal case, involving constitutional questions, in Salinger V.
United States, (1927) 272 U. S. 542, 47 Sup. Ct. 173, 71 L. Ed. 398. See
also footnotes 101 and 102 and text.
Section 238 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 345 and supple-
ment, now reads as follows:
"Sec. 345. (Judicial Code, section 238, amended) Appellate jurisdiction
from decrees of the United States district courts-A direct review by the
Supreme Court of an interlocutory or final judgment or decree of a district
court may be had where it is so provided in the following sections or parts
of sections, and not otherwise:
(1) Section 29 of Title 15, and section 45 of Title 49.(2) Section 682 of Title 18, where the decision of the district court
is adverse to the United States.
(3) Section 380 of this title.
(4) So much of sections 47 and 47a of this title as relate to the re-
view of interlocutory and final judgments and decrees in suits to enforce,
suspend, or set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission other
than for the payment of money.
(5) Section 217 of Title 7. (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, sec. 238, 36 Stat.
1157; Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, sec. 2, 38 Stat. 804; Feb. 13, 1925. ch. 229, sec.
1, 43 Stat. 938.)"
A brief analysis of the foregoing may be made as follows:
1. Subdiv. (1) above, comes within the Title of Commerce and Trade.
Title 15 and section 29 thereof gives to the United States, when it is com-
plainant in a suit thereunder, the right of direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. The second reference in subd. (1) above comes within Title 49.
Transporiation, and section 45 thereof gives similar rights to the United
States only.
2. Subdiv. (2) above comes within Title 18, Criminal Code and
Criminal Procedure, and likewise gives the right of direct appeal only to
the United States, under certain conditions involving questions of consti-
tutional law. The Salinger Case, supra, was within thL subdivision.
3. Subdiv. (3) above refers to section 266, being sec. 380 of Title 28,
Judicial Code and Judiciary.. See footnote 2.
4. Subdiv. (4) above, refers to the Urgent Deficiencies Act, also
within this title, Title 28. See footnote 1.
5. Subdiv. (5) above, comes within the title Agriculture, Title 7. and
section 217 thereof provides that the procedure to restrain orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act,
shall apply in suits to restrain orders of the Secretary of Agriculture, under
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not be determined finally until settled by the Supreme Court, the
plaintiff, in a given case, runs the risk of entering the wrong court
or following the wrong procedure. The lower courts, too, may err
for the same reason. Cases have been discussed above in which,
for example, three judges have acted although the cases were held
by the Supreme Court not to be within the section. There has
been no decision by that Court squarely holding such action to
be reversible error and without jurisdiction. 1 3 The five cases in
which the statutory court functioned although the cases were held
outside of the section were all appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. In the first of these, the Wilson Ca.Se,'14 a state statute
was challenged on the ground of its unconstitutionality, but no
interlocutory injunction was sought by the plaintiff; three judges
sat and entered a decree dismissing the bill. On direct appeal to
the Supreme Court, the appeal was dismissed, but the Court
expressly avoided a determination of the question whether such
action of the statutory court was error, for the Court said:
"Here there was no application for an interlocutory injunction,
and hence no necessity for a final hearing before three judges,
the Packers and Stockyards Act. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead Case comes
within this section. See footnote 1.
6. Prior to the amendment of Feb. 13, 1925, section 238 authorized
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the district courts, under Comp.
Stat. 1215, 1215a, in cases where the jurisdiction of the district courts was
invoked solely on the grounds that state legislation was invalid because in
conflict with the federal constitution. The W. T. Waggoner Estate Case,
(1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed. 699, was such a case, and
although decided by the Supreme Court in 1927, had been started prior to
the amendment. (Cf. Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42
Sup. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458, also before the amendment, in which the circuit
court of appeals was held, however, to have jurisdiction of an appeal from
the district court because in the case a federal statute was challenged.)
1"Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 235, 51
Sup. Ct. 429, 75 L. Ed. 555. (For the facts and other portions of the
opinion of this case, see footnote 47.) On the question of the propriety
of three judges acting in the case, the Court held that the suit was primarily
for damages under the Interstate Commerce Act, rather than a suit under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act to restrain the order of the Commission; that
under the former, the plaintiff was given a choice between two non-cutnu-
lative remedies, one being a claim for damages before the Commission, the
other being a suit for damages in the federal district court; that the plain-
tiff by presenting its claim before the commission made an election of
remedies which barred it from suing in court. The Court said:
"It is hardly necessary to add, since section 9 [of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. sec. 9] contemplates Ihat the jurisdiction in such
cases shall be exercised by the federal district court as ordinarily constituted,
the specially constituted court is without jurisdiction to dispose of an
action under that section, even if brought in the district court in the first
instance." (Italics and matter in brackets, ours.)
114Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed.
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although it may not have been error for three judges to sit, a
question we do not find it necessary to decide. There is therefore
no jurisdiction in this court to hear the appeal, which must ac-
cordingly be dismissed."
The rule of this case may be briefly stated as follows: in cases
not within the section, appeal from the district court lies, in the
first instance, exclusively in the circuit court of appeals. Or,
stating the same rule from the viewpoint of the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, there is no jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
on direct appeal from the district court. The great majority' 14
of the cases held not within the section are clearly in harmony with
this rule. However, the application of the rule to actual cases is*
difficult. A modification, if not an outright exception, would
seem to be necessary, based on whether or not the case is obviously
within or without the section, and whether the final determination
sustains the application of the section, and on the composition of
the district court, whether one, or three judges.
It would seem that some modification of the rule has in fact
been made in the four later cases, which otherwise would seem
in conflict with it. If the rule, unmodified, means that the de-
termination finally made on the applicability of the section by the
Supreme Court should control the procedure below retroactively,
the rule would be impossible in practice. And it might be said
that the Supreme Court, itself, violated the rule in the four later
cases 1 6 in which it exercised jurisdiction by affirming two cases"
and reversing two cases" 5 on direct appeal from the statutory
three-judge district court, although the Supreme Court expressly
held in the same cases that they were not within the Urgent De-
ficiencies Act. Under the rule of the Wilson, the Moore and
"'1In re Buder, (1926) 271 U. S. 461, 46 Sup. Ct. 557, 70 L. Ed. 1036;
Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct. 105. 71
L. Ed. 273; Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. CL 385, 71
L. Ed. 699; Ex parte Williams, (1928) -977 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72
L. Ed. 877; Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278
U. S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202, Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280
U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 353. Cf. Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277
U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990.
116See text following footnote 127. Cf. Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277
U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990, at footnote 127.
117Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1928) 277 U. S. 172. 48
Sup. Ct 466, 72 L. Ed. 838; Standard Oil Co. v. United States. (1931) 283
U. S. 235, 51 Sup. Ct. 429, 75 L. Ed. 555.
"sPiedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, (1930) 280 U. S.
469, 50 Sup. Ct. 192, 74 L. Ed. 551; United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R.
Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 237, 75 L. Ed. 349.
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Collins Cases,119 it would seem that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction except for the purpose of dismissing the appeals and
that the function of affirming or reversing the district court was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals.
This conclusion would be undeniable if in the four cases the
Court had said that it was reversible error for three judges to act
for any purpose in cases which the Supreme Court might later
hold to be outside of the section and that in so acting they were
wholly without any jurisdiction. It might be said, moreover, that
the Supreme Court in reviewing the action below on direct appeal
from the district court is itself acting inconsistently with the
Wilson, the Moore, and Collins Cases 20 if not actually contradict-
ing them. It might be said that such action by the Supreme Court
would nullify other statutes regulating the appellate practice in
the federal courts and would oust the Circuit Court of Appeals
of its appellate jurisdiction; that the Supreme Court would be
doing the work of the lower courts and would be adding to the
confusion in the profession.
Can the cases be reconciled? The four cases were brought
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act rather than under section 266,
and for this reason, the question of jurisdiction 12 1 of the federal
courts was not present. These cases may, perhaps, be distin-
guished further from the Wilson, the Moore, and Collins Cases
for the reason that in the Wilson Case no interlocutory injunction
119Smith v. Wilson, (1927) 273 U. S. 388; 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L. Ed.
699; Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990
(for facts of this case, see footnote 24, and see also footnote 127) ; Moore
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct. 105, 71 L. Ed.
273, see footnote 108.
12OSee footnote 119. Another instance of the Supreme Court's dis-
pensing with needless formality and defects in technical procedure in in-
voking its jurisdiction, is found in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v.
United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384, 73 L. Ed. 798, in which
the Supreme Court vacated an order of the Interstate Commerce Coninlis-
sian instead of remanding the case to the statutory court with directions to
vacate the order. See footnotes 98, 107, and 108.
"
1 The four cases were brought under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to
challenge action of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and therefore one
important question always present in cases brought under section 266 was
not present in the four cases, viz: the question of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, as such. In the four cases, the action of a federal commission
was challenged in a federal tribunal. The decisive issue was whether or
not the cases came within the special provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies
Act, rather than under the ordinary statutes regulating the procedure in
the federal courts. This question in turn depended upon whether the action
challenged was or was not an "order" within the meaning of the special
act.
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was sought, and in the Collins Case, no state statute or order was
challenged. This, it is submitted, is the controlling distinction, if
any, because for the reason that such relief was not sought, the
Wilson Case was obviously not within the section. Mere inspec-
tion of the bill of complaint, without reference to any other plead-
ing or argument, would reveal the inapplicability of the section,
whereas in the four cases such relief was sought and the decisive
question was whether or not certain acts of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission were "orders" within the meaning of the
Urgent Deficiencies Act. The answer to this question could not
be given on mere inspection of the bill, or even on inspection of all
the pleadings. The question was relatively more difficult and
required considerable effort and a judicial determination after ar-
gument or brief on a fine question of law. Much the same sort of
distinction which obtains in prescribing the method by which
objections to defective pleadings may be presented, under the rules
of the law of pleading, can be made here, namely, that where de-
fects may be set up by demurrer when they appear on the face of a
pleading, a defect not so appearing must usually be set up by a
special plea. The basis for the rule of pleading applies to the
present question. Where the case is obviously not within the sec-
tion because no interlocutory injunction is sought, then the case
will not be converted into one within the section merely because
three judges are assembled and act thereon. 12 This would be true
also in a case where that relief, although originally sought, was
abandoned in open court either by withdrawal, 123 or by conceding
the constitutionality of the statute or order challenged and seeking
the relief on other and usual equitable grounds."" The situation
in the four cases, on the other hand, presented a legal question ior
determination and required argument and brief as the basis for a
judicial determination. The same may be said of the questions
arising under the section, as to whether or not a "statute" or an
"order" of an "officer" is involved. 2 In fact, all the vital ques-
tions upon which the application of the section or of the act de-
'
2 2 See footnote 11.
231%Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (19-6) 272 U. S. 317, 47 Sup. Ct.
105, 71 L. Ed. 273; Hobbs v. Pollock, (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct.
83, 74 L. Ed. 353.
12 4Hobbs v. Pollock (1929) 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed.
353.
' See discussion above under headings "Statutes," "Orders," "Offi-
cers,' etc.
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pend fall within this category, as compared to the question whether
or not an interlocutory injunction is sought.
It is suggested, therefore, that the modified rule to be taken
from the decisions and, in particular, from the Wilson and per-
haps, the Collins Case,120 is that in cases obviously not within the
section, there is no right of direct review by the Supreme Court
either by direct appeal or mandamus. It is immaterial that three
judges have acted in the case and that their action is sought to be
reviewed. But, if the section is held inapplicable for any of the
other involved reasons just mentioned, then, where three judges
function as a district court, direct review of their action will lie
in the Supreme Court. And it is immaterial that the decision of
the three judges is that the section does not apply, or that the
Supreme Court affirms or reverses such decision or determines for
the first time the inapplicability of the section.12' That is, it is
immaterial for the purpose of jurisdiction and propriety of three
judges acting in the case. On this basis, the cases are perhaps
in harmony and not mutually inconsistent.
--6See footnote 119. That is, that the decision of the Wilson Case is
confined strictly to the facts then before the Court, a case in which no
interlocutory injunction was sought. The Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
Case would be in the same category because in that case the prayer for
the interlocutory injunction was abandoned. The Collins Case is less clearly
within the modified rule (see footnotes 24, 127 and text). for while the
section applies only where a statute of a state, or order of a state board
is challenged and when the officer of such state is sought to be restrained,
and therefore it would seem patent on the face of a bill in which only an
ordinance of a municipality was challenged or an official of the municipality
was sought to be restrained that the section did not apply, yet several of
the cases on this question have required a determination by the Supreme
Court, as has been indicated in the discussion above. Moreover, the situ-
ation might arise in which a municipal ordinance was in fact passed in whole
or in part for the benefit of the state, or is enforced for such purpose.
The question of a municipal officer acting for the state either under a state
statute or under a municipal ordinance has been suggested above (see foot-
note 50). However, the Collins Case may be said to be in harmony with
the modified rule for, in the absence of the elements suggested, the situa-
tion would be that the bill did not on its face purport to come within the
section. The elements which might invoke the applicability of the section
would have to be set out in the bill, and without them the bill, using the
analogous rule of pleading again, would be demurrable and therefore comes
within the modified rule.
1271n Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277 U.S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L.
Ed. 990. a case held not within the section because a city ordinance and city
officials only were sought to be restrained, the Court said:
"Mandamus is the appropriate remedy. Ex parte Metropolitan Water
Co., 220 U. S. 539, 546, 31 Sup. Ct. 600, 55 L. Ed. 575, Ex parte Williams,
277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523, 72 L. Ed. 877 decided May 14, 1928. But
as we deem it clear that the case is not within the scope of Section 266, we
deny' leave to file the petition."
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The rule, thus modified or understood, would provide for the
circumstances and practical necessities arising in the course of
litigation. The very fact that the question of the applicability of
the section controls the procedure makes it necessary that the
question be determined as soon as possible in a given case. The
jurisdiction to determine that question, at least for the purpose
of designating the proper tribunal, must be lodged somewhere,
irrespective of the correctness or the outcome of such determina-
tion. Litigants ought not to be subjected to any uncertainty, delay,
or expense which might be avoided by establishing definitely which
court has such jurisdiction. Moreover, the three judges constitut-
ing the statutory court ought not be placed in the position of
having acted without authority of law, or having committed re-
versible error, solely because the final decision by the Supreme
Court in a given case holds that the section does not apply. The
modified rule, indicated above, would avoid all these evils and
make it dear that the statutory district court of three judges is
and ought to be the court 2- to make the initial decision on the
question of the application of the section with the right of review
in the Supreme Court, with full power and jurisdiction in both
courts to act for such purpose, regardless of the fact that the final
decision may be that the case is not within the section.
Another question may arise where the three judges refuse to
act and remand the case to a single judge. To illustrate the nature
of this question, suppose counsel, in a given case, proceeds on the
basis of his opinion that the case falls within the section, and
three judges are assembled. At any stage in the proceedings, they
may conclude that the section does not apply, and for that reason
they may (a) remand the case to a single judge,2 - or (b) dismiss
the bill, 30 or (c) deny the interlocutory or permanent injunction
12BBecause, if the section is found to apply, the statutory court would
have exclusive jurisdiction (see text at footnote 107). This would exclude
the ordinary district court of one judge as well as the circuit court of ap-
peals. Under the general rule that the tribunal whose jurisdiction is invoked
or is questioned is ordinarily the tribunal which determines, in the first in-
stance, whether jurisdiction is present, it would seem that in proceedings
under section 266 or under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, where the issue is
whether jurisdiction of the statutory court is present, that such court should
be and is the proper and only court to determine that question in the first
instance. Specifically, neither the district court of one judge nor the cir-
cuit court of appeals should or can function in this respect.
-29See footnote 82 and text.
13OThis disposition was made by the three judges in fifteen of the
nineteen cases (see footnote 86). That is, in all of these cases, except the
two cited in footnote 82, and in the two cases in footnote 118.
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sought. 1' Does review of such action lie in the Supreme Court,
or in the Circuit Court of Appeals? The situation presented when
the bill is dismissed or the injunctive relief sought is denied 3"'
would seem to call for and allow review by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court because the section expressly authorizes such re-
view in cases where the relief is denied as well as in cases where it
is allowed. This would not be true, of course, where the basis for
the action of the three judges is the fact that no interlocutory in-
junction was sought. But where the action of the three judges
takes the form of remanding the case to a single judge, the addi-
tional question arises whether this is an appealable order. If it is
not, the question of which court has jurisdiction of an appeal is
immaterial and superfluous. Will mandamus Jie, and if so, in
which court? Disregarding the case where no interlocutory in-
junction is sought, it is suggested that mandamus would lie in the
Supreme Court. The alternative would be to ask for a rehearing
by the three judges or to make a second request before the single
judge to call in two other judges again. But this would be an idle
gesture for all practical purposes. 3 3 Mandamus proceedings in
the Supreme Court would be resorted to in the event that the
single judge refused the second request. So the practical result
would be mandamus proceedings in any event, the only difference
being that after such second request the proceedings would be di-
rected against the single judge rather than against the three judges.
On the other hand, if the action of remanding may be construed,
for the purpose of determining the question of the applicability
of the section, as being in effect an appealable order, the procedure
indicated above" 4 would apply.
With respect to the tribunal, rather than to the method of
appeal, it may ,be well to consider what steps may be taken. First,
review in the circuit court of appeals might be sought. However,
if the plaintiff is the aggrieved party, he must, to be consistent,
abandon his request for an interlocutory injunction either by
131Smith v. Wilson (1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 385, 71 L, Ed.
699; Ex parte Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup, Ct. 523, 72 L, Ed.
877.
13"See footnote 136.
"3'The single judge would, under the circumstances, probably refuse to
call two other judges for the second time. But if lie did, they could re-
mand the case again. In theory at least, this might go on indefinitely. For
the situation where the single judge refuses to call in two other judges,
see footnote 110 and text.
134See footnote 125 to 127, inclusive and text.
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withdrawing it or by conceding the constitutionality of the statute
or order challenged. Either party by such appeal must and does
concede that the case is not within the section because if he insists
that the section does apply he throws his own case out of the
circuit court. If the case is found to be wvithin the section, the
circuit court of appeals would be without jurisdiction.135 Man-
damus in the circuit court of appeals by either party is even more
obviously improper. The only other course open is to seek re-
view in the Supreme Court either by direct appeal or by man-
damus; the former on the ground, perhaps, that the action of the
three judges in remanding the case is in effect a denial of the in-
terlocutory and permanent injunction sought,"", the latter, to
compel the three judges to reconvene.
It is suggested that the last step is the proper one and should
be available in all cases where the statutory court remands the case
to a single judge, except where the section is obviously inapplica-
ble, as where no interlocutory injunction is sought. This pro-
cedure would eliminate delay and the futile second request before
the single judge to call in two other judges. It would eliminate
much of the delay and expense involved in an appeal, and such
saving is especially desirable where, as in such proceedings, the
merits137 of the case have not been adequately considered. It
would authoritatively settle the question of the application of the
section, and it would settle the question of procedure. This pro-
cedure was followed in the Public National Bank Case,13 8 in
which the plaintiff, after the statutory court had remanded the
case to a single judge, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
235See footnote 96 and text.
'36This course was followed in many of the cases. For a typical
case, see Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, (1928) 278
U. S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202. See also Grubb v. Public Util.
Comm'n of Ohio, (1930) 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374. 74 L. Ed. 972;
Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, (1930) 281 U. S. 249, 50 Sup.
Ct. 315, 74 L. Ed. 832.
"'3That the merits will not be considered by the Supreme Court on
review of action of the lower courts on interlocutory injunction, unless
accompanied by other action disposing finally of the case, see State of Ala-
bama v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 229, 49 Sup. Ct. 266, 73 L. Ed.
675.
".SEx parte The Public National Bank of New York. (1928) 278 U. S.
101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202. For the facts of this case, see footnote
49. Cf. Ex parte Collins, (1928) 277 U. S. 565, 48 Sup. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed.
990, footnote 127, which was a proceeding against a single judge only,
and compare, Ex parte Williams, (1928) 277 U. S. 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 523.
72 L. Ed. 877, footnote 25.
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mandamus against the three judges to compel them to reconvene.
The writ was denied on the ground that since city officials only
were sought to be restrained rather than "officers of a state," the
case was not within the section, and hence three judges were not
necessary. With the soundness of the decision there can be no
quarrel. The procedure is equally sound for it was the means of
having settled the question of the application of the section.
SUM UARY
In practice, the troublesome question which arises first is
whether a given case falls within the section. The correct answer
to this question almost automatically will take care of the in-
cidental questions of which court is the proper one, when three
judges are necessary, the powers of a single judge, and the pro-
cedure for -review. The controlling question is difficult and
technical and has been the decisive issue in many of the cases in
which the question was not settled until the final determination of
the Supreme Court. It is suggested that in arriving at a decision
on this question counsel may well analyze the facts of his case,
with a view to determining the following questions:
1. Is a legislative act of a state challenged and its "enforce-
ment, operation, or execution" sought to be restrained by inter-
locutory injunction in the federal court?
2. Is "any officer of such state" sought to be restrained in
such enforcement, operation, or execution?
3. Is the legislative act of the state (a) a "state statute" or
(b) "an order made by an administrative board or commission
acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such state?"
4. Is the statute or order challenged on the grofnd of its
unconstitutionality under the federal constitution or laws?
5. Is an "interlocutory injunction" sought, and if so, is it
pressed ?
Perhaps question 5 should be considered first because it is
easiest to answer, and if such answer be in the negative, there can
be no question that the case does not fall within the section, and
any further inquiry is needless.
Briefly, if an affirmative answer properly is made to all of
these questions, the suit will fall within the section, and three
judges are necessary for all decisions other than a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. If the answer to any one of these
questions is properly in the negative, the suit is not within the
section, and the single judge has full power to act.
